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A lamp does not make the ground safe. It makes the ground legible, which is the only honest thing a risk page can offer. Folding five separate failure modes into one score tells you a number and hides which layer is about to give.
The path bitcoin takes to reach Solana, and who can halt or reverse it.
Custodial / 1 hop / 22.17M depth
No bridge leg at all. Issuance happens directly on Solana against a reserve, so nothing in this layer applies.
Bridged / 2 hops / 28.41M depth
Wrapped twice, with the second leg carried by the bridge that lost 326 million dollars to a signature verification flaw on Solana in 2022. That loss was made whole by a backer, which is a fact about the backer.
Program controlled / 1 hop / 96K depth
A permissioned signer set moves bitcoin into the program. The signers are named firms and the threshold they sign at is not published, so the size of the set cannot be checked against the risk it carries.
Custodial / 1 hop / 490K depth
No bridge leg. Issued directly against an exchange reserve.
Grade is a judgementThe evidence beside each grade is a reading. Disagree with the grade and the reading still stands.
Overall high, from 7 layers carrying 22 graded factors between them. They are listed separately because they fail separately.
| Representation | Held by | Hops | Freezable | Proof of reserve | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cbBTCcustodial | Coinbase | 1 | yes | type Enone automated | low |
| WBTCbridged | BitGo, bridged through Wormhole Portal | 2 | no | type Enone automated | medium |
| zBTCprogram-controlled | Zeus Network | 1 | no | type A | high |
| xBTCcustodial | OKX |
Written as conditions rather than as adjectives, so a grade can be argued with.
Every row names the surface here that it lands on. A risk page listing other people’s failures without that column is decoration.
326.00Mmade whole
2022-02-02 / Signature verification bypass
The bridge that issues the WBTC representation carrying the deepest trading liquidity on Solana. The loss was covered in full by a backer, which is a fact about that backer and not about the bridge.
295.00Mnot recovered
2026-04-01 / Compromised admin and manipulated token price
The venue a basis seam would have been built on. Both halves of the technique, an admin key and an external price, are surfaces LODZ has too.
450.00Mnot recovered
2022-11-12 / Private key compromise
Every representation accepted here is a claim on bitcoin held by somebody else, reached over a custodian, a bridge, a permissioned signer set, or several of those at once. Grading the layers tells you which of them you are relying on. It does not make you rely on none of them, and nothing on this site is described as safe or assured.
The program routing your position is upgradeable and values collateral from an external price. Those are the two surfaces that combined to take 295 million dollars out of a venue on this chain in April. Naming them is not a defence; it is the precondition for building one.
| yes |
| type A |
| medium |
Killed the Sollet bridge behind soBTC. That token still exists, still reports 16,149 units outstanding, and still trades at a 99.96 percent discount. Issuer failure does not need a hack.
115.00Mnot recovered
2022-10-11 / Price oracle manipulation
The exact reason collateral is not valued from a single price source.
624.00Mnot recovered
2022-03-23 / Validator keys taken by social engineering
A small permissioned signer set is the shape of the guardian arrangement behind the program-controlled representation.
190.00Mnot recovered
2022-08-01 / Trusted root left open by an initialisation error
An upgrade mistake, not a cryptographic break. Every upgradeable program here carries the same possibility.
126.00Mnot recovered
2023-07-07 / Private key compromise
Operational dependence on one party, which is the same shape as a single custodian holding the reserve.
Pulled from the incident dataset. Dates in it are recorded to the day, and individual post mortems were not cross-read.