Contract
1EaGq2PtdsxhZicYsrMXcVMLXMdyqpbUNQJjfZBpump
Advancing
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A lamp does not make the ground safe. It makes the ground legible, which is the only honest thing a risk page can offer. Folding five separate failure modes into one score tells you a number and hides which layer is about to give.
The path bitcoin takes to reach Solana, and who can halt or reverse it.
Custodial / 1 hop / 22.17M depth
No bridge leg at all. Issuance happens directly on Solana against a reserve, so nothing in this layer applies.
Bridged / 2 hops / 28.41M depth
Wrapped twice, with the second leg carried by the bridge that lost 326 million dollars to a signature verification flaw on Solana in 2022. That loss was made whole by a backer, which is a fact about the backer.
Program controlled / 1 hop / 96K depth
A permissioned signer set moves bitcoin into the program. The signers are named firms and the threshold they sign at is not published, so the size of the set cannot be checked against the risk it carries.
Custodial / 1 hop / 490K depth
No bridge leg. Issued directly against an exchange reserve.
Grade is a judgementThe evidence beside each grade is a reading. Disagree with the grade and the reading still stands.
Written as conditions rather than as adjectives, so a grade can be argued with.
Every row names the surface here that it lands on. A risk page listing other people’s failures without that column is decoration.
326.00Mmade whole
2022-02-02 / Signature verification bypass
The bridge that issues the WBTC representation carrying the deepest trading liquidity on Solana. The loss was covered in full by a backer, which is a fact about that backer and not about the bridge.
295.00Mnot recovered
2026-04-01 / Compromised admin and manipulated token price
The venue a basis seam would have been built on. Both halves of the technique, an admin key and an external price, are surfaces LODZ has too.
450.00Mnot recovered
2022-11-12 / Private key compromise
Killed the Sollet bridge behind soBTC. That token still exists, still reports 16,149 units outstanding, and still trades at a 99.96 percent discount. Issuer failure does not need a hack.
115.00Mnot recovered
Pulled from the incident dataset. Dates in it are recorded to the day, and individual post mortems were not cross-read.
Three of the four representations publish a reserve figure through an attestation feed. Only one publishes the address holding the reserve, which is the difference between a number you can read and a number you can test. It is not the largest one.
Reserve address published, plus an attestation stream
921.94099593 BTC held against 921.85600753 BTC issued
Reconciled at 100.0092 percent. Two independent block explorers returned the same balance to the satoshi across 2,050 transactions. The excess is 0.085 BTC, which is nine thousandths of one percent, so this is a match rather than a cushion. Three of the four issuance figures are issuer-published and were not read on their own chains.
Read 2026-08-15T07:00Z
Attestation feed on Arbitrum
59.72451737 BTC attested against 59.67314796 BTC on Solana
The feed reads slightly above the Solana supply, which is the safe direction, but the same representation exists on other chains, so a whole-supply reconciliation is not available from this pair of figures alone.
Read 2026-08-14T23:03:01Z
Every representation accepted here is a claim on bitcoin held by somebody else, reached over a custodian, a bridge, a permissioned signer set, or several of those at once. Grading the layers tells you which of them you are relying on. It does not make you rely on none of them, and nothing on this site is described as safe or assured.
The program routing your position is upgradeable and values collateral from an external price. Those are the two surfaces that combined to take 295 million dollars out of a venue on this chain in April. Naming them is not a defence; it is the precondition for building one.
2022-10-11 / Price oracle manipulation
The exact reason collateral is not valued from a single price source.
624.00Mnot recovered
2022-03-23 / Validator keys taken by social engineering
A small permissioned signer set is the shape of the guardian arrangement behind the program-controlled representation.
190.00Mnot recovered
2022-08-01 / Trusted root left open by an initialisation error
An upgrade mistake, not a cryptographic break. Every upgradeable program here carries the same possibility.
126.00Mnot recovered
2023-07-07 / Private key compromise
Operational dependence on one party, which is the same shape as a single custodian holding the reserve.
Attestation feed on the origin asset, plus the bridge leg
2,714.55044689 BTC locked against 2,631.90720452 BTC issued
The bridge leg checks out at 1.03 times cover, read directly from the lock contract. The custody leg behind it does not: no outside party can confirm the bitcoin standing behind the origin asset, and third party audits of that custody are not documented. One of two hops verified is not a verified asset.
Read 2026-08-14T12:42:35Z
Attestation feed on Ethereum and Base, none on Solana
97,086.34658173 BTC attested across all chains
No reserve address is published, so the attested figure cannot be tested against a chain. This is the largest representation on Solana and the only one of the four where a reconciliation cannot even be attempted.
Read 2026-08-15T02:04:35Z
The one that reconciles clears by 0.085 BTC, which is nine thousandths of one percent of what it has issued. That is a match, not a cushion, and three of its four issuance figures are issuer-published rather than read on their own chains. Stating the limit is part of the reading.
